| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9544 |
| DP9544 Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games | |
| Hans Peter Grüner; Dirk Engelmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-07 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Optimal voting rules have to be adjusted to the underlying distribution of preferences. However, in practice there usually is no social planner who can perform this task. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they decide in a second stage may increase the sum of individuals? payoffs if players are not all completely selfish. We run three closely related experimental treatments (plus two control treatments) to understand how privately informed individuals decide when they choose voting rules and when they vote. Efficiency concerns play an important role on the rule choice stage whereas selfish behavior seems to dominate at the voting stage. Accordingly, in an asymmetric setting groups that can choose a voting rule do better than those who decide with a given simple majority voting rule. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bayesian voting experiments Revelation principle. Two-stage voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9544 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538380 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Peter Grüner,Dirk Engelmann. DP9544 Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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