G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9544
DP9544 Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games
Hans Peter Grüner; Dirk Engelmann
发表日期2013-07-07
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要Optimal voting rules have to be adjusted to the underlying distribution of preferences. However, in practice there usually is no social planner who can perform this task. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they decide in a second stage may increase the sum of individuals? payoffs if players are not all completely selfish. We run three closely related experimental treatments (plus two control treatments) to understand how privately informed individuals decide when they choose voting rules and when they vote. Efficiency concerns play an important role on the rule choice stage whereas selfish behavior seems to dominate at the voting stage. Accordingly, in an asymmetric setting groups that can choose a voting rule do better than those who decide with a given simple majority voting rule.
主题Public Economics
关键词Bayesian voting experiments Revelation principle. Two-stage voting
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9544
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538380
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Hans Peter Grüner,Dirk Engelmann. DP9544 Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games. 2013.
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