| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9545 |
| DP9545 Exclusive contracts and market dominance | |
| Giacomo Calzolari; Vincenzo Denicolò | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-07 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of exclusive dealing that rehabilitates pre-Chicago-school analyses. Our theory rests on two realistic assumptions: that firms are imperfectly informed about demand, and that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals. Under those assumptions, exclusive contracts tend to be pro-competitive when the dominant firm's competitive advantage is small, but are anti-competitive when it is more pronounced. In this latter case, the dominant firm uses exclusivity clauses as a means to increase its market share and profit, without necessarily driving its rivals out of the market, or impeding their entry. We discuss the implications of these results for competition policy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Exclusive dealing Dominant firm Non-linear pricing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9545 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538381 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo Calzolari,Vincenzo Denicolò. DP9545 Exclusive contracts and market dominance. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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