G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9552
DP9552 Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design
David Martimort; Elisabetta Iossa
发表日期2013-07-14
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要A risk averse agent gathers information on productivity shocks and produces accordingly on behalf of his principal. Information gathering is imperfect so that the agent has either complete or no knowledge at all of those shocks. The model allows for moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. Two polar scenarios of the agency literature with either pure hidden action (the agent exerts operating effort not knowing yet the realization of the shock) or pure hidden information (the agent knows that shock when exerting operating effort) arise endogenously with positive probability. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following ?good news? with a fixed low-powered option that solves a pure moral hazard problem otherwise.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Hidden action Hidden information Incentive mechanisms Information gathering
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9552
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538388
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
David Martimort,Elisabetta Iossa. DP9552 Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design. 2013.
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