| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9552 |
| DP9552 Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design | |
| David Martimort; Elisabetta Iossa | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-14 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A risk averse agent gathers information on productivity shocks and produces accordingly on behalf of his principal. Information gathering is imperfect so that the agent has either complete or no knowledge at all of those shocks. The model allows for moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. Two polar scenarios of the agency literature with either pure hidden action (the agent exerts operating effort not knowing yet the realization of the shock) or pure hidden information (the agent knows that shock when exerting operating effort) arise endogenously with positive probability. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following ?good news? with a fixed low-powered option that solves a pure moral hazard problem otherwise. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hidden action Hidden information Incentive mechanisms Information gathering |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9552 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538388 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Martimort,Elisabetta Iossa. DP9552 Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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