| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9559 |
| DP9559 Contracting With Synergies | |
| Itay Goldstein; Alex Edmans | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-14 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies multi-agent optimal contracting with cost synergies. We model synergies as the extent to which effort by one agent reduces his colleague's marginal cost of effort. An agent's pay and effort depend on the synergies he exerts, the synergies his colleagues exert on him and, surprisingly, the synergies his colleagues exert on each other. It may be optimal to "over-work" and "over-incentivize" a synergistic agent, due to the spillover effect on his colleagues. This result can rationalize the high pay differential between CEOs and divisional managers. An increase in the synergy between two particular agents can lead to a third agent being endogenously excluded from the team, even if his own synergy is unchanged. This result has implications for optimal team composition and firm boundaries. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Complementarities Principal-agent problem Multiple agents Teams Synergies Influence |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9559 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538395 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Itay Goldstein,Alex Edmans. DP9559 Contracting With Synergies. 2013. |
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