| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9562 |
| DP9562 Credibility For Sale | |
| Harris Dellas | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-21 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a sovereign debt model with official and private creditors where default risk depends on both the level and the composition of liabilities. Higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives to repay but carries extra costs, such as reduced ex-post flexibility. The model implies that official lending to sovereigns takes place in times of debt distress; carries a favorable rate; and can displace private funding even under pari passu provisions. Moreover, in the presence of long-term debt overhang, the availability of official funds increases the probability of default on existing debt, although default does not trigger exclusion from private credit markets. These findings help shed light on joint default and debt composition choices of the type observed during the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Default Enforcement Official lending Sovereign debt |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9562 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538397 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harris Dellas. DP9562 Credibility For Sale. 2013. |
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