G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9562
DP9562 Credibility For Sale
Harris Dellas
发表日期2013-07-21
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要We develop a sovereign debt model with official and private creditors where default risk depends on both the level and the composition of liabilities. Higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives to repay but carries extra costs, such as reduced ex-post flexibility. The model implies that official lending to sovereigns takes place in times of debt distress; carries a favorable rate; and can displace private funding even under pari passu provisions. Moreover, in the presence of long-term debt overhang, the availability of official funds increases the probability of default on existing debt, although default does not trigger exclusion from private credit markets. These findings help shed light on joint default and debt composition choices of the type observed during the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词Default Enforcement Official lending Sovereign debt
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9562
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538397
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Harris Dellas. DP9562 Credibility For Sale. 2013.
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