| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9571 |
| DP9571 Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration | |
| Patrick Rey; Elisabetta Iossa | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-07-21 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi-period contract, when the agent?s productivity is a stochastic function of his past productivity and investment. We show that incentives are stronger and performance is higher when the contract approaches its expiry date. Contrary to common wisdom, long-term contracts may strengthen reputational effects whereas short-term contracting may be optimal when investment has persistent, long-term effects. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Career concerns Career duration Contract renewal Reputation Dynamic incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9571 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538406 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Rey,Elisabetta Iossa. DP9571 Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration. 2013. |
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