| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9587 |
| DP9587 Private, social and self-insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help: A political economy analysis | |
| Pierre Pestieau; Philippe De Donder | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-11 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-risk ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority chosen level. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Crowding out Familism Long-term care Social insurance Voting Weak and strong prospects of family help |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9587 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538423 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Pestieau,Philippe De Donder. DP9587 Private, social and self-insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help: A political economy analysis. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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