G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9606
DP9606 Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union
Harald Uhlig
发表日期2013-08-18
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses, should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds. I argue that regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, while regulators in other ?safe? countries will impose tighter regulation. As a result, governments in risky countries get to borrow more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses on the common central bank.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Euro zone crisis Sovereign default risk Bank regulation Risk shifting Common central bank European central bank Ecb Repurchase operations Haircuts
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9606
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538441
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Harald Uhlig. DP9606 Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union. 2013.
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