| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9607 |
| DP9607 First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics | |
| Michael McMahon; Stephen Hansen | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-18 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide the first direct empirical support for the relevance of signalling in monetary policy. In our dynamic model, central bankers make policy under uncertain inflationary conditions and place different weights on output fluctuations. Signalling leads all bankers to be tougher on inflation initially, but to become less tough with experience. This evolution is more pronounced for members who weight output more ("doves"), which provides an additional test of our model. We structurally estimate the model using Bank of England data and confirm both predictions. Signalling increases the probability new members vote for high interest rates by up to 35%. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Signalling monetary policy Committees |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9607 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538442 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael McMahon,Stephen Hansen. DP9607 First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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