| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9618 |
| DP9618 Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation | |
| Jeremy Bulow; Paul Klemperer | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-08-25 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Today?s regulatory rules, especially the easily-manipulated measures of regulatory capital, have led to costly bank failures. We design a robust regulatory system such that (i) bank losses are credibly borne by the private sector (ii) systemically important institutions cannot collapse suddenly; (iii) bank investment is counter-cyclical; and (iv) regulatory actions depend upon market signals (because the simplicity and clarity of such rules prevents gaming by firms, and forbearance by regulators, as well as because of the efficiency role of prices). One key innovation is ?ERNs? (equity recourse notes--superficially similar to, but importantly distinct from, ?cocos?) which gradually "bail in" equity when needed. Importantly, although our system uses market information, it does not rely on markets being ?right?. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank capital Capital requirements Debt overhang Contingent capital Bank crisis Regulatory capital Bail-in Too-big-to-fail Living wills Systemically important financial institution |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9618 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538453 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeremy Bulow,Paul Klemperer. DP9618 Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation. 2013. |
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