全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP9621 The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP9621
	DP9621 The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries
	Hans Degryse; Armin Schwienbacher; Thomas Lambert
发表日期	2013-09-01
出版年	2013
语种	英语
摘要	Initially, voting rights were limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets. The franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the uncertainty and financial returns from stock markets. Our panel data evidence covering 1830-1999 shows that tighter restrictions on the voting franchise induce a greater stock market development, whereas a broader voting franchise is more conducive towards the banking sector, consistent with Perotti and von Thadden (2006). Our results are robust to controlling for other political determinants and endogeneity.
主题	Financial Economics
关键词	Banking sector Financial development Financial structure Political economy Stock markets Voting franchise
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp9621
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538456
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Hans Degryse,Armin Schwienbacher,Thomas Lambert. DP9621 The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries. 2013.