| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP9637
|
| DP9637 The Real Costs of Disclosure |
| Alex Edmans
|
| 发表日期 | 2013-09-08
|
| 出版年 | 2013
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper models the effect of disclosure on real investment. We show that, even if the act of disclosure is costless, a high-disclosure policy can be costly. Some information ("soft") cannot be disclosed. Increased disclosure of "hard" information augments absolute information and reduces the cost of capital. However, by distorting the relative amounts of hard and soft information, increased disclosure induces the manager to improve hard information at the expense of soft, e.g. by cutting investment. Investment depends on asset pricing variables such as investors' liquidity shocks; disclosure depends (non-monotonically) on corporate finance variables such as growth opportunities and the manager's horizon. Even if a low disclosure policy is optimal to induce investment, the manager may be unable to commit to it. If hard information turns out to be good, he will disclose it regardless of the preannounced policy. Government intervention to cap disclosure can create value, in contrast to common calls to increase disclosure. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Cost of capital.
Disclosure
Financial and real efficiency
investment
Managerial myopia
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9637
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538473
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alex Edmans. DP9637 The Real Costs of Disclosure. 2013.
|
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