G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9641
DP9641 Complexity, Efficiency, and Fairness of Multi-Product Monopoly Pricing
Eugenio Miravete; Katja Seim; Jeff Thurk
发表日期2013-09-15
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board administers the purchase and sale of wine and spirits across the state and is legally mandated to charge a uniform 30% markup on all products. We use an estimated discrete choice model of demand for spirits, together with information on wholesale prices, to assess the welfare and redistribution implications of the chosen uniform markup rule. We find that it reduces welfare significantly, but mimics the optimal behavior of a multi-product monopolist. Relative to product-specific prices, the uniform prices do not exploit the observed heterogeneity of consumption across products and demographic groups reflected in relative spirit demand elasticities. They implicitly tax high-income and educated households by overpricing their favored spirit varieties. Our estimated returns to very sophisticated pricing strategies are small indicating the use of more complex pricing mechanisms as being neither socially desirable nor privately profitable.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Complex pricing Multi-product price discrimination Taxation by regulation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9641
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538477
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Eugenio Miravete,Katja Seim,Jeff Thurk. DP9641 Complexity, Efficiency, and Fairness of Multi-Product Monopoly Pricing. 2013.
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