| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9651 |
| DP9651 Reputation and Entry in Procurement | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Jeff Butler | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-09-15 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There is widespread concern that favoring suppliers with good past performance, a standard practice in private procurement, may hinder entry by new firms in public procurement markets. In this paper we report results from a laboratory experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. We implement a repeated procurement game with reputational incentives for quality and the possibility of entry. We allow also the entrant to start off with a positive reputational score. Our results suggest that while some past-performance based reputational mechanisms do reduce the frequency of entry, appropriately designed mechanisms can significantly increase it. Moreover, the reputational mechanism we investigate typically increases quality but not prices, suggesting that well designed mechanisms may generate very large gains for buyers and taxpayers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bid preferences Entry Feedback mechanisms Outsourcing Past performance Procurement Quality assurance Reputation Vendor rating |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9651 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538487 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Jeff Butler. DP9651 Reputation and Entry in Procurement. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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