| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP9720
|
| DP9720 Financing Through Asset Sales |
| Alex Edmans; William Mann
|
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-03
|
| 出版年 | 2013
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Most research on firm financing studies the choice between debt and equity. We model an alternative source -- non-core asset sales -- and identify three new factors that drive a firm's choice between selling assets and equity. First, equity investors own a claim to the cash raised. Since cash is certain, this mitigates the information asymmetry of equity (the "certainty effect"). In contrast to Myers and Majluf (1984), even if non-core assets exhibit less information asymmetry, the firm issues equity if the financing need is high. This result is robust to using the cash for an uncertain investment. Second, firms can disguise the sale of a low-quality asset as instead motivated by operational reasons ? dissynergies ? and thus receive a higher price (the "camouflage effect"). Third, selling equity implies a "lemons" discount for not only the equity issued but also the rest of the firm, since its value is perfectly correlated. In contrast, a "lemons" discount on assets need not lead to a low stock price, as the asset is not a carbon copy of the firm (the "correlation effect"). |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Asset sales
Financing
Pecking order
Synergies
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9720
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538556
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alex Edmans,William Mann. DP9720 Financing Through Asset Sales. 2013.
|
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