| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9725 |
| DP9725 Risky Investments with Limited Commitment | |
| Thomas Cooley; Ramon Marimon; Vincenzo Quadrini | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-10 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Over the last three decades there has been a dramatic increase in the size of the financial sector and in the compensation of financial executives. This increase has been associated with greater risk-taking and the use of more complex financial instruments. Parallel to this trend, the organizational structure of the financial sector has changed with the traditional partnership replaced by public companies. The organizational change has increased the competition for managerial talent, which may have weakened the commitment between investors and managers. We show how increased competition and the weaker commitment can raise the managerial incentives to undertake risky investment. In the general equilibrium, this change results in higher risk-taking, a larger and more productive financial sector with greater income inequality (within and across sectors), and a lower market valuation of financial institutions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Financial corporate governance Financial risk Income inequality Limited commitment Managerial incentives Parnerships |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9725 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538561 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Cooley,Ramon Marimon,Vincenzo Quadrini. DP9725 Risky Investments with Limited Commitment. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
