| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9727 |
| DP9727 Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts | |
| Winand Emons; Claude Fluet | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-10 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs' attorneys offer contingent fees providing incentives to proceed with strong and drop weak cases. By contrast, defense attorneys work for fixed fees under which they accept all cases. Since the defense commits to fight all cases, few victims sue in the first place. We thus explain the fact that in the US virtually all plaintiffs use contingency while defendants tend to rely exclusively on fixed fees. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contingent fees Expert services Fixed fees Litigation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9727 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538563 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Winand Emons,Claude Fluet. DP9727 Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts. 2013. |
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