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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP9728 |
DP9728 Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising | |
Kai-Uwe Kühn; Francine Lafontaine; Ying Fan | |
发表日期 | 2013-11-10 |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Financial constraints are an important impediment to the growth of small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically how the financial constraints of agents affect their decisions to exert effort, and, hence the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of franchising. We find that a 30 percent decrease in average collateralizable housing wealth in a region delays chains' entry into franchising by 0.28 years on average, 9 percent of the average waiting time, and slows their growth by around 10 percent, leading to a 10 percent reduction in franchised chain employment. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Collateralizable housing wealth Contracting Empirical Entry Financial constraints Growth Incentives Principal-agent |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9728 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538564 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kai-Uwe Kühn,Francine Lafontaine,Ying Fan. DP9728 Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising. 2013. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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