| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9739 |
| DP9739 Liquidity and Governance | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; Tao Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-17 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an active role in governance. We show that an increase in the liquidity of the firm's stock increases the likelihood of the large investor ?taking the Wall Street walk.? Thus, higher liquidity is harmful for governance. Empirical tests using three distinct sources of exogenous variation in liquidity confirm the negative relation between liquidity and blockholder activism. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Hedge funds Kyle models Liquidity Shareholder activism Shareholder proposals Wall street walk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9739 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538575 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,Tao Li. DP9739 Liquidity and Governance. 2013. |
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