| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9743 |
| DP9743 Risking Other People?s Money | |
| Jean-Robert Tyran; Erik Wengström | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-17 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline condition without such incentives, we find that the decision makers respond strongly to these incentives that result in an increased risk exposure of others. However, we find that the increase in risk taking is mitigated by altruistic preferences and pro-social personality traits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Competition Hedging Incentives Risk taking Social preferences |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9743 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538579 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean-Robert Tyran,Erik Wengström. DP9743 Risking Other People?s Money. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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