| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9745 |
| DP9745 An allegory of the political influence of the top 1% | |
| John E Roemer; Philippe De Donder | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-17 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how rich shareholders can use their economic power to deregulate firms that they own, thus skewing the income distribution towards themselves. Agents differ in productivity and choose how much labor to supply. High productivity agents also own shares in the productive sector and thus earn capital income. All vote over a linear tax rate on (labor and capital) income whose proceeds are redistributed lump sum. Capital owners also lobby in order to ease the price cap imposed on the private firm. We solve analytically for the Kantian equilibrium of this lobbying game together with the majority voting equilibrium over the tax rate, and we perform simulations. We obtain numerically that, as the capital income distribution becomes more concentrated among the top productivity individuals, their increased lobbying effort generates efficiency as well as equity costs, with lower labor supply and lower average utility levels in society. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Kantian equilibrium Lobbying Political economy Regulatory capture |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9745 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538581 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John E Roemer,Philippe De Donder. DP9745 An allegory of the political influence of the top 1%. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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