| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9753 |
| DP9753 Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets?What Are the Welfare Effects? | |
| Johan Lagerlof; Christoph Schottmüller | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-11-24 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information acquisition cost c, the consumer gathers information and the optimal contracts are close to the ones in the Stiglitz model. If c is so low that the consumer already gathers information (cc*, marginally reducing c hurts the insurer and weakly benefits the consumer. Paradoxically, a reduction in c that is ?successful,? meaning that the consumer gathers information after the reduction but not before it, can hurt both parties. The reasons for this are that, after the reduction, (i) the cost is actually incurred and (ii) the contracts can be more distorted. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Asymmetric information Information acquisition Insurance Screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9753 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538589 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johan Lagerlof,Christoph Schottmüller. DP9753 Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets?What Are the Welfare Effects?. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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