G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9774
DP9774 Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information
Johan Lagerlof; Christoph Schottmüller
发表日期2013-12-08
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice, consumers can determine the precision of a privately observed signal that is informative about their accident risk. The equilibrium effort is, depending on parameter values, either zero (implying symmetric information) or positive (implying privately informed consumers). Regardless of the nature of the equilibrium, all offered contracts, also at the top, involve underinsurance. The reason is that underinsurance at the top discourages information gathering. We identify a sorting effect that explains why the insurer wants to discourage information acquisition. Moreover, a public policy that decreases the information gathering costs can hurt both parties. Lower information gathering costs can harm consumers because the insurer adjusts the optimal contract menu in an unfavorable manner.
主题Public Economics
关键词Adverse selection Asymmetric information Information acquisition Insurance Screening
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9774
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538610
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Johan Lagerlof,Christoph Schottmüller. DP9774 Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information. 2013.
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