| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9774 |
| DP9774 Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information | |
| Johan Lagerlof; Christoph Schottmüller | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-12-08 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice, consumers can determine the precision of a privately observed signal that is informative about their accident risk. The equilibrium effort is, depending on parameter values, either zero (implying symmetric information) or positive (implying privately informed consumers). Regardless of the nature of the equilibrium, all offered contracts, also at the top, involve underinsurance. The reason is that underinsurance at the top discourages information gathering. We identify a sorting effect that explains why the insurer wants to discourage information acquisition. Moreover, a public policy that decreases the information gathering costs can hurt both parties. Lower information gathering costs can harm consumers because the insurer adjusts the optimal contract menu in an unfavorable manner. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Asymmetric information Information acquisition Insurance Screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9774 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538610 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johan Lagerlof,Christoph Schottmüller. DP9774 Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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