| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9785 |
| DP9785 Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment | |
| Philipp Kircher | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-12-08 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap-talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is efficient, constrained only by search frictions. We also show that the performance of an alternative trading protocol in the cheap-talk environment depends on the level of price dispersion generated by the protocol: If a trading protocol compresses (spreads) the distribution of prices relative to the first-price auction, then an efficient fully revealing equilibrium always (never) exists. Our results identify the settings in which cheap talk can serve as an efficient competitive instrument, in the sense that the central insights from the literature on competing auctions and competitive search continue to hold unaltered even without ex ante price commitment. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Directed search Competitive search Commitment Cheap talk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9785 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538621 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philipp Kircher. DP9785 Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment. 2013. |
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