G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9789
DP9789 Incentive Pay and Performance: Insider Econometrics in a Multi-Unit Firm
Jan Svejnar
发表日期2014-01-26
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We exploit organizational reforms in a foreign-owned bank in Central-East Europe to study the implementation of modern HRM policies in an emerging market context. We have branch-level data and use our knowledge of the process that led to the adoption of the reforms to implement two estimators that address endogeneity bias in a complementary fashion: an IV approach and Generalized Propensity Score estimation. Our results show that some of the reforms had a positive impact on productivity, but they also underscore the risks of quantity-based incentives where quality is important.
主题Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Banking Central and eastern europe Endogeneity of hrm policies Foreign ownership Incentives Insider econometrics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9789
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538625
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jan Svejnar. DP9789 Incentive Pay and Performance: Insider Econometrics in a Multi-Unit Firm. 2014.
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