| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9790 |
| DP9790 On discrimination in procurement auctions | |
| Philippe Jehiel; Laurent Lamy | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-01-26 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | With exogenous participation, strong bidders should be discriminated against weak bidders to maximize revenues (Myerson 1981). When participation is endogenous and the set of potential entrants is large, optimal discrimination if any takes a very different form. Without incumbents, there should be no discrimination even if entrants come from groups with different characteristics. With incumbents, those should be discriminated against entrants no matter how strong/weak they are even if some share of their surplus is internalized by the designer. The optimal reserve policy in standard auctions is also analyzed to shed light on situations in which discrimination is not permitted. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric buyers Auctions with endogenous entry Bid preference programs Cartels Favoritism Government procurement Incumbents Optimal auction design Poisson games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9790 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538626 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Jehiel,Laurent Lamy. DP9790 On discrimination in procurement auctions. 2014. |
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