G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9791
DP9791 On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices
Philippe Jehiel; Laurent Lamy
发表日期2014-01-26
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要From a theory viewpoint, the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices also called absolute auctions, or the use of auctions with secret reserve prices is somehow puzzling despite being common. By allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret, we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge. We also analyze how buyers with various sophistications and sellers with various costs sort into the different formats, thereby offering a range of testable predictions. Alternative approaches are reviewed.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Absolute auctions Analogy-based expectations Competing auctions Endogenous entry Rational expectations Secret reserve prices
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9791
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538627
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Philippe Jehiel,Laurent Lamy. DP9791 On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices. 2014.
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