| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9827 |
| DP9827 Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms | |
| Tommaso Valletti; Frago Kourandi | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a two-sided model with two competing Internet platforms, and a continuum of Content Providers (CPs). We study the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investments in the market for Internet access, and on innovation in the market for content. Under the alternative discriminatory regime, platforms charge a priority fee to those CPs which are willing to deliver their content on a fast lane. We find that under discrimination investments in broadband capacity and content innovation are both higher than under net neutrality. Total welfare increases, though the discriminatory regime is not always beneficial to the platforms as it can intensify competition for subscribers. As platforms have a unilateral incentive to switch to the discriminatory regime, a prisoner's dilemma can arise. We also consider the possibility of sabotage, and show that it can only emerge, with adverse welfare effects, under discrimination. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Innovation investment Net neutrality Platform competition Two-sided markets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9827 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538663 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tommaso Valletti,Frago Kourandi. DP9827 Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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