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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP9833 |
DP9833 Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection | |
Michael Kosfeld; Ferdinand Von Siemens | |
发表日期 | 2014-02-16 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team?s performance and therefore on their colleagues? productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers? indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence. |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
关键词 | Adverse selection Competition Externality Team production |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9833 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538668 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Kosfeld,Ferdinand Von Siemens. DP9833 Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection. 2014. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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