G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9833
DP9833 Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection
Michael Kosfeld; Ferdinand Von Siemens
发表日期2014-02-16
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team?s performance and therefore on their colleagues? productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers? indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence.
主题Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics
关键词Adverse selection Competition Externality Team production
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9833
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538668
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michael Kosfeld,Ferdinand Von Siemens. DP9833 Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection. 2014.
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