| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9864 |
| DP9864 Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy | |
| Giuseppe Bertola; Winfried Koeniger | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-02 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and insurance combination that is unique and satisfies first- and second-order conditions. Modeling insurance incompleteness in terms of costly production of private insurance services, we characterize the constrained inefficiency arising in general equilibrium from competitive pricing of non-exclusive financial contracts. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Constrained efficiency First-order approach Hidden action Principal agent |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9864 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538698 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giuseppe Bertola,Winfried Koeniger. DP9864 Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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