| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9866 |
| DP9866 Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework | |
| Kjetil Storesletten; Giovanni L. Violante; Jonathan Heathcote | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-02 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. At the same time, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, and aggravates the externality associated with valued public expenditures. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all of these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preferences, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the externality linked to valued government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting desired progressivity. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Progressivity Income distribution Skill investment Labor supply Partial insurance Valued government expenditures Welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9866 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538700 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kjetil Storesletten,Giovanni L. Violante,Jonathan Heathcote. DP9866 Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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