| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9871 |
| DP9871 Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision | |
| Thierry Verdier; Thierry Tressel | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-09 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a moral hazard economy with the potential for collusion between bankers and borrowers to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates or a low return on investment may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium is not optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the state of the macro-financial cycle, and that,in presence of production externalities, the capital ratio should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We study the political economy of supervision. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles by weakening the quality of banking supervision when instead it should be strengthened. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Banking regulation Regulatory forbearance Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9871 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538705 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,Thierry Tressel. DP9871 Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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