| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9877 |
| DP9877 Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay | |
| Roman Inderst; Florian Hoffmann; Marcus Opp | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-09 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Our paper examines the effect of recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses for compensation contracts in the financial sector. We study a multi-task setting in which a bank employee, the agent, privately chooses (deal or customer) acquisition effort and diligence, which stochastically reduces the occurrence of negative events over time (such as loan defaults or customer cancellations). The key ingredient of the compensation contract is the endogenous timing of a long-term bonus that trades off the cost and benefit of delay resulting from agent impatience and the informational gain, respectively. Our main finding is that government interference with this privately optimal choice may |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Compensation design Financial regulation Principal-agent models |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9877 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538711 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,Florian Hoffmann,Marcus Opp. DP9877 Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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