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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP9896 |
DP9896 Pricing Internet Traffic: Exclusion, Signalling and Screening | |
Bruno Jullien; Wilfried Sand-Zantman | |
发表日期 | 2014-03-16 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We consider a network that intermediates traffic between free content providers and consumers. While consumers do not know the traffic cost when deciding on consumption, a content provider knows his cost but may not control the consumption. We study how pricing consumers' and content providers' sides allows both profit extraction from the network and efficient information transmission. In the case of uniform tariff, we argue that a positive price-cap on the charge to content is optimal (with no constrain on the consumer side). Proposing menus helps signaling useful information to consumers and therefore adjusting consumption to traffic cost. In the case of menus, we show that optimal mechanisms consist in letting the content producers choose between different categories associated with different prices for content and consumers. Our results are robust to competition between ISPs and to competition between contents. We also show that when (competitive) content providers choose at small cost between a pay and a free business model, a price-cap at cost on the price for content improves efficiency. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Information Intranet Net neutrality Traffic management |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9896 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538730 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruno Jullien,Wilfried Sand-Zantman. DP9896 Pricing Internet Traffic: Exclusion, Signalling and Screening. 2014. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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