G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9902
DP9902 Managing Credit Bubbles
Jaume Ventura; Alberto Martin
发表日期2014-03-23
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We study a dynamic economy where credit is limited by insufficient collateral and, as a result, investment and output are too low. In this environment, changes in investor sentiment or market expectations can give rise to credit bubbles, that is, expansions in credit that are backed not by expectations of future profits (i.e. fundamental collateral), but instead by expectations of future credit (i.e. bubbly collateral). During a credit bubble, there is more credit available for entrepreneurs: this is the crowding-in effect. But entrepreneurs must also use some of this credit to cancel past credit: this is the crowding-out effect. There is an "optimal" bubble size that trades of these two effects and maximizes long-run output and consumption. The "equilibrium" bubble size depends on investor sentiment, however, and it typically does not coincide with the "optimal" bubble size. This provides a new rationale for macroprudential policy. A lender of last resort can replicate the "optimal" bubble by taxing credit when the "equilibrium" bubble is too high, and subsidizing credit when the "equilibrium" bubble is too low. This leaning-against-the-wind policy maximizes output and consumption. Moreover, the same conditions that make this policy desirable guarantee that a lender of last resort has the resources to implement it.
主题Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics
关键词Bubbles Business cycles Credit Economic growth Financial frictions Pyramid schemes
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9902
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538736
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jaume Ventura,Alberto Martin. DP9902 Managing Credit Bubbles. 2014.
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