G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9908
DP9908 All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
Aner Sela; Yizhaq Minchuk
发表日期2014-03-23
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that if the number of prizes is smaller than the number of players, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, a player's probability to win as well as his expected utility increases in his value for this prize. We demonstrate that a stochastic dominance relation between two distribution functions of the players' private values may increase but also even decrease the players' ex-ante expected utility as well the players' expected total effort. Also, increasing the number of prizes may decrease the players' ex-ante expected utility. Thus, we may conclude that a larger number of prizes does not necessarily benefit the players in a contest.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词All-pay auctions Contests Uncertain prizes
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9908
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538742
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Aner Sela,Yizhaq Minchuk. DP9908 All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes. 2014.
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