| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9909 |
| DP9909 Political Competition and the Limits of Political Compromise | |
| Emanuel Ornelas | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider an economy where competing political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimum level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if they expect future governments to do the same. We find that, if the government cannot manipulate state variables, more intense political competition fosters a compromise that yields better outcomes, potentially even the first best. By contrast, if the government can issue debt, vigorous political competition can render a compromise unsustainable and drive the economy to a low-welfare, high-debt, long-run trap. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Efficient policies Political turnover Public debt |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9909 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538743 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emanuel Ornelas. DP9909 Political Competition and the Limits of Political Compromise. 2014. |
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