G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9909
DP9909 Political Competition and the Limits of Political Compromise
Emanuel Ornelas
发表日期2014-03-23
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We consider an economy where competing political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimum level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if they expect future governments to do the same. We find that, if the government cannot manipulate state variables, more intense political competition fosters a compromise that yields better outcomes, potentially even the first best. By contrast, if the government can issue debt, vigorous political competition can render a compromise unsustainable and drive the economy to a low-welfare, high-debt, long-run trap. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.
主题Development Economics ; International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词Efficient policies Political turnover Public debt
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9909
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538743
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Emanuel Ornelas. DP9909 Political Competition and the Limits of Political Compromise. 2014.
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