| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9910 |
| DP9910 The Politics of Compromise | |
| Alessandro Bonatti | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A team must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for its members. Each agent chooses a project and exerts costly effort affecting its random completion time. When one or more projects are complete, agents bargain over which one to implement. A consensus requirement can (but need not) induce the efficient balance between compromise in project selection and equilibrium effort. Imposing deadlines for presenting counteroffers is beneficial, while delegating decision-making to an impartial third party leads agents to select extreme projects. Finally, hiring agents with opposed interests can foster both effort and compromise in project selection. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Compromise Conflict Consensus Deadlines Free-riding |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9910 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538744 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Bonatti. DP9910 The Politics of Compromise. 2014. |
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