| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9915 |
| DP9915 Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care | |
| Luigi Siciliani | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The increased availability of process measures implies that quality of care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable quality is well-described in the incentive-design literature. We seek to narrow the large gap between actual price-setting behaviour in Pay-For-Performance schemes and the incentive literature. We present a model for setting prices for process measures of quality and show that optimal prices should reflect the marginal benefit of health gains, providers? altruism and the opportunity cost of public funds. We derive optimal prices for processes incentivised in the Best Practice Tariffs for emergency stroke care in the English National Health Service. Based on published estimates, we compare these to the prices set by the English Department of Health. We find that actual tariffs were lower than optimal, relied on an implausibly high level of altruism, or implied a lower social value of health gains than previously used. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Pay for performance Provider behaviour Optimal price-setting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9915 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538749 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Siciliani. DP9915 Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care. 2014. |
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