| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9923 |
| DP9923 Preserving "Debt Capacity" or "Equity Capacity": A Dynamic Theory of Security Design under Asymmetric Information | |
| Roman Inderst; Vladimir Vladimirov | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-04-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a dynamic model of optimal security design, we show when firms should preserve "equity capacity" through choosing high target leverage or "debt capacity" through choosing low target leverage. Thereby, firms reduce a problem of underinvestment or overinvestment when they must raise future financing under asymmetric information. Which problem arises depends on whether additional financing is raised at competitive terms or whether there is a lock-in with initial investors. Firms initial (or target) capital structure matters as it affects the "outside option" of both insiders and outside investors. Our theory also entails implications for start-up and venture capital financing. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Capital structure Dynamic security design Venture capital financing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9923 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538757 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,Vladimir Vladimirov. DP9923 Preserving "Debt Capacity" or "Equity Capacity": A Dynamic Theory of Security Design under Asymmetric Information. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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