G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9924
DP9924 Audit rates and compliance: A field experiment in long-term care
Maarten Lindeboom; Bas van der Klaauw
发表日期2014-04-06
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We provide evidence from a large-scale field experiment on the causal effects of audit rules on compliance in a market for long-term care. In this setting care should be provided quickly and, therefore, the gatekeeper introduced ex-post auditing. Our results do not show significant effects of variations in random audit rates and switching to a conditional audit regime on the quantity and quality of applications for care. We also do not find evidence for heterogeneous effects across care providers differing in size or hospital status. Our preferred explanation for the lack of audit effects is the absence of direct sanctions for noncompliance. The observed divergence of audit rates in the conditional audit regime is the consequence of sorting and thus identifies the quality of application behavior of providers.
主题Public Economics
关键词Auditing Compliance Feedback Field experiment Long-term care
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9924
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538758
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Maarten Lindeboom,Bas van der Klaauw. DP9924 Audit rates and compliance: A field experiment in long-term care. 2014.
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