G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9926
DP9926 The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt
Stewart C Myers; Bart Lambrecht
发表日期2014-04-06
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We present a dynamic agency model of investment, borrowing and payout decisions by a mature corporation operating in perfect financial markets. Risk-averse managers implement an inter-temporal strategy that maximizes their lifetime utility of managerial rents. They under-invest and smooth payout and rents. Debt is the shock-absorber for operating income and investment. Managers do not rebalance capital structure, so shocks to debt levels persist. Managers implement precautionary savings by paying down debt, even when interest is tax-deductible. We generate empirical predictions that differ from conventional agency models and from dynamic models based on financing frictions.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Agency Financing policy investment Payout
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9926
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538760
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Stewart C Myers,Bart Lambrecht. DP9926 The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt. 2014.
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