| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9927 |
| DP9927 Ex post information rents in sequential screening | |
| Roland Strausz; Daniel Krähmer | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-04-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information disclosure Information rents Sequential screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9927 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538761 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland Strausz,Daniel Krähmer. DP9927 Ex post information rents in sequential screening. 2014. |
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