| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9929 |
| DP9929 Delegation and Dynamic Incentives | |
| Roland Strausz | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-04-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball effect, which mitigates an efficient agent's ratchet incentive, and a carrot effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with production complementarity. We also consider different modes of commitment to yield insights into optimal organizational boundaries. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Agency Delegation Dynamic incentives Limited commitment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9929 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538763 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland Strausz. DP9929 Delegation and Dynamic Incentives. 2014. |
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