| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9930 |
| DP9930 Moral Hazard and Debt Maturity | |
| Rafael Repullo; Gur Huberman | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-04-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model of the maturity of a bank's uninsured debt. The bank borrows funds and chooses afterwards the riskiness of its assets. This moral hazard problem leads to an excessive level of risk. Short-term debt may have a disciplining effect on the bank's risk-shifting incentives, but it may lead to inefficient liquidation. We characterize the conditions under which short-term and long-term debt are feasible, and show circumstances under which only short-term debt is feasible and under which short-term debt dominates long-term debt when both are feasible. Thus, short-term debt may have the salutary effect of mitigating the moral hazard problem and inducing lower risk-taking. The results are consistent with key features of the common narrative of the period preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Inefficient liquidation Long-term debt Optimal financial contracts Risk-shifting Rollover risk Short-term debt |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9930 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538764 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rafael Repullo,Gur Huberman. DP9930 Moral Hazard and Debt Maturity. 2014. |
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