G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9955
DP9955 Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency
Francesco Bianchi; Leonardo Melosi
发表日期2014-04-27
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We develop a theoretical framework to quantitatively assess the general equilibrium effects and welfare implications of central bank reputation and transparency. Monetary policy alternates between periods of active inflation stabilization and periods during which the emphasis on inflation stabilization is reduced. When the central bank engages in only short deviations from active monetary policy, inflation expectations remain anchored and the model captures the monetary approach described as constrained discretion. However, if the central bank deviates for a prolonged period of time, agents become pessimistic about future monetary policy and uncertainty gradually rises. Reputation determines the speed with which agents' pessimism accelerates once the central bank starts deviating. When the model is fitted to U.S. data, the Federal Reserve is found to benefit from strong reputation and large flexibility in responding to inflationary shocks. Increasing transparency would improve welfare by anchoring agents' expectations.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Bayesian learning Inflation expectations Markov-switching models Reputation Uncertainty
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9955
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538788
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Francesco Bianchi,Leonardo Melosi. DP9955 Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency. 2014.
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