| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9960 |
| DP9960 Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring | |
| Stefano Rossi | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-05-04 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Are courts effective monitors of corporate decisions? In a controversial landmark case, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties, signaling a sharp increase in Delaware?s scrutiny over corporate decisions. In our event study, low-growth Delaware firms outperformed matched non-Delaware firms by 1% in the three day event window. In contrast, high-growth Delaware firms under-performed by 1%. Contrary to previous literature, we conclude that court decisions can have large, significant and heterogeneous effects on firm value, and that rules insulating directors from court scrutiny benefit the fastest growing sectors of the economy. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Case law Corporate governance Monitoring Regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9960 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538793 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefano Rossi. DP9960 Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring. 2014. |
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