G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9963
DP9963 When warm glow burns: Motivational (mis)allocation in the non-profit sector
Thierry Verdier; Gani Aldashev; Esteban Jaimovich
发表日期2014-05-04
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model of an economy with the non-profit sector financed through private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non-profit sector (because of a higher income in the for-profit sector, a stronger preference for giving, or an inflow of foreign aid) worsens the motivational composition and performance of the non-profit sector. If motivated donors give more than unmotivated ones, there exist two stable (motivational) equilibria. Linking donations to the motivational composition of the non-profit sector or a tax-financed public funding of non-profits can eliminate the bad equilibrium.
主题Development Economics ; Public Economics
关键词altruism Charitable giving Foreign aid. Non-profit organizations Occupational choice
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9963
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538796
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Thierry Verdier,Gani Aldashev,Esteban Jaimovich. DP9963 When warm glow burns: Motivational (mis)allocation in the non-profit sector. 2014.
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