| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9996 |
| DP9996 Auction House Guarantees for Works of Art | |
| Jonathan Hamilton; Kathryn Graddy | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-05-25 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Auction houses use both in-house and third-party guarantees for sellers who are concerned about the risk that not enough bidders will enter the auction for their works. Auction houses are compensated for guarantees by buyers? commissions and successful sales after attracting important works of art. Sellers compensate third-party guarantors by splitting the excess of the final sale price over the guarantee. The guarantor can bid in the auction, and at Christie's, the third-party guarantor still receives a share of the difference between the winning price and the guarantee price, even if he wins the auction, which means the guarantor has a ?toehold?. We explore the effect of guarantees (both in-house and third-party) on prices in art auctions, using a large database of auctions and a smaller database of repeat sales. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Economics of art Price guarantees Toeholds in auctions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9996 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538828 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan Hamilton,Kathryn Graddy. DP9996 Auction House Guarantees for Works of Art. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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