| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10021 |
| DP10021 Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium | |
| Mikhail Drugov | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-06-08 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies a dynamic bargaining model with informational externalities between bargaining pairs. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the price they will pay for their work while its cost is agents' private information and correlated between them. The principals benchmark their agents against each other by making the same offers in the equilibrium even if this involves delaying or advancing the agreement compared to the autarky. When principals compete in complements this pattern is reinforced while under competition in substitutes the principals trade off the benefits of differentiation in the product market against the cost of the agents' rent. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Bargaining Competition Delay Externalities Information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10021 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538853 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mikhail Drugov. DP10021 Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium. 2014. |
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